Post-Racial Proxy Battles over Immigration by Fan, Mary D.
University of Washington School of Law
UW Law Digital Commons
Chapters in Books Faculty Publications
2014
Post-Racial Proxy Battles over Immigration
Mary D. Fan
University of Washington School of Law, mdfan@uw.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/faculty-chapters
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Immigration Law Commons, and the
State and Local Government Law Commons
This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at UW Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Chapters in Books by an authorized administrator of UW Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mary D. Fan, Post-Racial Proxy Battles over Immigration, in Strange Neighbors: The Role of States in Immigration Policy
229 (Carissa Byrne Hessick & Gabriel J. Chin eds., 2014).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/faculty-chapters/3
Strange Neighbors 
Carissa Byrne Hessick, Gabriel J. Chin
Published by NYU Press
Hessick, C. B. & Chin, G. J..
Strange Neighbors: The Role of States in Immigration Policy.
New York: NYU Press, 2014. 
Project MUSE., https://muse.jhu.edu/.
For additional information about this book




Post-Racial Proxy Battles over Immigration
Mary Fan
Introduction
Amid economic and political turmoil, anti-immigrant legislation has 
flared again among a handful of fiercely determined states.1 To justify 
the intrusion into national immigration enforcement, the dissident 
states invoke imagery of invading hordes of “illegals”2—though the 
unauthorized population actually fell by nearly two-thirds, decreas-
ing by about a million people, between 2007 and 2009 as the recession 
reduced the lure of jobs.3 
 Arizona’s Senate Bill 1070—recently invalidated in part by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Arizona v. United States4—led the charge.5 By pre-
election-year summer 2011, several states enacted laws patterned after 
Arizona’s controversial Senate Bill 1070, including Alabama’s even 
more aggressive HB 56.6 A host of lawsuits are pending against the new 
laws,7 which are at least partially invalid after Arizona v. United States. 
Other controversial proposals circulate, such as eliminating birthright 
citizenship or branding the birth certificates of alleged “anchor babies” 
implanted in the United States by foreigners.8 
 This chapter examines how the spurt of state legislation is a proxy 
way to vent resurgent racialized anxieties and engage in friend-enemy 
politics founded on conflict with the “Other”—the foreign enemy 
within—in a time of economic and political turmoil. Despite the 
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ostensibly a-racial construct of the illegal alien used to legitimize the 
lashing out, it is suffused with racialized perception.9 Current tactics 
parallel the overtly racialized hostility of past episodes of states enact-
ing out anti-immigrant legislation. The oft-raised concern in such a 
fiercely polarized time is racial discrimination. Antidiscrimination law, 
however, does not offer the remedy for this concern. 
 The chapter explores alternate frames for rendering antidiscrimi-
nation commitments legally legible. Rather than striking dissident 
state immigration legislation because of the interests of “them”—
the marginalized people most impacted by the laws—invalidation is 
grounded in shared interests and constitutional commitments. Con-
vergent interests include the constitutionally designed balance of fed-
eral power on issues requiring coordinated rather than conflicting 
approaches. Such an approach mitigates polarization by making con-
vergent interests, rather than racial divergence, salient. Hearteningly, 
recent landmark decisions, including Arizona v. United States, do not 
ignore antidiscrimination values. Rather, the decisions illuminate 
the shared interests impacted by discrimination concerns, such as 
impairment of foreign relations and commerce. This chapter analyzes 
the way antidiscrimination values inform preemption analyses used 
to invalidate encroaching state immigration laws fueled by fear and 
loathing. 
 Part 1 analyzes two hot-button forms of resurgent state and local 
anti-“alien” laws of our times—laws patterned on the Arizona tem-
plate and the anti–birthright citizenship movement. It explores the 
dominance of racialized anxieties behind the seemingly race-neu-
tral construct of the vilified alien. Part 2 contrasts the friend-enemy 
politics and legislation of our contemporary scene with the state and 
local legislation and furor against the Chinese during the turbulent 
politics of the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Part 3 exam-
ines the polarization-ameliorating bases for decisions to cut back on 
overreaching state and local laws in order to make shared interests, 
rather than racial difference, salient while protecting underlying anti-
discrimination values. The approach helps build bridges between dis-
sonant worldviews to navigate the profoundly polarized politics and 
legislation of our times.
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I. The Resurgence of Aggressive State Anti-“Alien” Laws
Two of the most aggressive and controversial forms of state and 
local anti-immigrant legislation include (1) the “attrition-through-
enforcement”-type laws patterned after Arizona Senate Bill 1070 that 
aim to drive out perceived aliens by creating a hostile environment 
through a multifront attack and (2) and the anti–birthright citizenship 
movement aimed against U.S.-born children of aliens. 
A. The “Attrition-through-Enforcement” Attack Strategy
The strategy behind the “attrition through enforcement” approach is 
to create an atmosphere of fear that drives undocumented people to 
“self-deport.” As the bill’s cosponsor, Arizona State Representative John 
Kavanagh, explained, “it’s about creating so much fear they will leave 
on their own.”10 The details of the laws vary somewhat, but they share a 
similar strategy of creating a totalizing atmosphere of hostility through 
a multipronged attack. 
 For example, Arizona’s template law directs police to check immigra-
tion status during mundane traffic and other temporary stops if  there is 
a “reasonable suspicion” of unlawful status.11 Though it generally is not 
a crime for a removable alien to remain in the United States, the legisla-
tion also authorizes police to arrest people without warrant based on 
probable cause of removability due to commission of a public offense.12 
Reaching into private interactions, some of the new laws also criminal-
ize such mundane but vital activities as job seeking by aliens, giving a 
ride or renting to a suspected undocumented person, or leaving home 
without carrying alien registration documents.13 
 To take Alabama’s particularly aggressive example, the state’s con-
troversial House Bill 56 criminalized, among other things, transporting 
someone or entering into a rental agreement in “reckless disregard[]” 
of a person’s undocumented status.14 The controversial rental provi-
sion was later legislatively deleted in May 2012.15 Plainly, the criminal-
ization of such mundane things as giving rides or renting—without 
even requiring knowledge of undocumented status—chills interaction 
with people who might be undocumented. Alabama’s legislation even 
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reaches into the schoolhouse, requiring school officials to determine the 
immigration status of children.16
 The laws press public officials and private actors—willing or not—
into creating an atmosphere of surveillance and suspicion.17 In the 
process, the laws upend previous policies aimed at building commu-
nity trust.18 To prevent the problem of crime victims fearing to turn to 
police or to bear witness, many police agencies have assured immigrant 
communities that they are not immigration-law enforcers.19 Upend-
ing the wisdom built on experience, the new breed of laws bars police 
from nonparticipation in federal immigration enforcement.20 Arizona’s 
template law also authorizes warrantless arrests of persons the offi-
cer believes has committed “any public offense that makes the person 
removable from the United States.”21 The Arizona law also requires that 
law enforcement officers in any lawful stop, detention, or arrest attempt 
to determine immigration status if “reasonable suspicion exists that the 
person is an alien who is unlawfully present” unless “the determination 
may hinder or obstruct an investigation.”22 
 As originally enacted, the law provided that officers “may not solely 
consider race, color or national origin,”23 apparently taking advantage 
of the Supreme Court’s 1975 decision in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce 
providing that race can be a relevant—albeit not sole—factor in estab-
lishing reasonable suspicion of alienage.24 Brignoni-Ponce held that 
“[t]he likelihood that any given person of Mexican ancestry is an alien 
is high enough to make Mexican appearance a relevant factor, but 
standing alone it does not justify stopping all Mexican-Americans to 
ask if they are aliens.”25 
 In response to the firestorm of controversy, the Arizona legislature 
amended Senate Bill 1070 to delete the adjective “solely.”26 As amended, 
the law provides that officials may not consider race, color, or national 
origin “except to the extent permitted by the United States or Arizona 
Constitution”27—which under Brignoni-Ponce means what the law said 
before: that race can be a relevant but not a sole factor.28 The amend-
ment gave Arizona some cover, however, in the ensuing political and 
legal battles. Indeed, the district court of Arizona apparently missed the 
wiggle clause and analyzed the law as if it barred consideration of race, 
color, or national origin.29 The states claim that their legislation avoids 
impermissibly intruding on the federal power over foreign affairs,30 
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foreign commerce, 31 and nationality rules32 because they merely mirror 
and enforce federal standards.33 A host of other provisions in the Ari-
zona law were constructed as mirror images—in some instances imper-
fectly so—of federal immigration crimes in an attempt to further thrust 
Arizona into immigration law and policy.34 The state law criminalizes 
failing to carry alien registration documents, transporting aliens, induc-
ing aliens to enter Arizona, and employing illegal aliens, among other 
actions.35 The act also goes further than federal law in criminalizing the 
actions of applying for work, soliciting work, or performing work by an 
undocumented person.36
 Arizona’s template for the new breed of state laws was fueled by 
incendiary politics painting Arizona as a state under siege. Bill spon-
sor Senator Pearce explained that his impetus was to stem the flood of 
Mexicans, proclaiming, “We have been overrun.  .  .  . [M]illions more 
will come behind them, and we will be overrun to the point that there 
will no longer be a United States of America.  .  .  . How long will it be 
before we will be just like Mexico?”37 Arizona governor Jan Brewer pro-
claimed, “We cannot afford all this illegal immigration and everything 
that comes with it, everything from the crime and [sic] to the drugs 
and the kidnappings and the extortion and the beheadings and the fact 
that people can’t feel safe in their community.”38 The president of the 
Arizona Sheriff ’s Association, Paul Babeu, also helped sound the crime 
and immigration alarm, telling FOX News that criminal “illegals” were 
to blame for Arizona having “the highest crime rates in America.”39 
 In reality, Arizona is experiencing as much of a decline in crime as 
the national average, if not more.40 Figures 8.1 and 8.2 plot crime rate 
data from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports for Arizona compared to 
the nation as a whole. As depicted, Arizona’s crime rate, like that of the 
nation overall, has been falling dramatically in recent years. Indeed, 
in 2009, Arizona enjoyed a lower violent crime rate than the nation 
overall. And while the curve for Arizona’s property crime rate has 
been higher than the national average, by 2009, the gap was narrowing 
because Arizona has experienced a steeper decline in property crimes 
than the national average. 
 Indeed, sociologists have argued that rather than aggravating crime, 
immigrants have a “protective” effect against crime. The protective effect 
stems from such factors as immigrants diluting violent street culture 
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with new norms: downplaying violence as the appropriate response to 
perceived slights, emphasizing strong family and ethnic ties, and revi-
talizing abandoned or malaised neighborhoods.41 A new study using 
pooled time-series cross-sectional data found that cities with the great-
est declines in homicides and robberies had the largest influx of immi-
grants.42 But perception—and social cascades of misperception spurred 
by opinion leaders—are what count in politics. And the immigration-
crime paradigm helped spur passage of Arizona Senate Bill 1070. 
 The Arizona attrition attack strategy is not the first of recent state 
legislation attempting to intervene in regulating immigrant life. Dur-
ing another intense anti-immigrant political broil, for example, Ari-
zona enacted the Legal Arizona Workers Act of 2007.43 The law makes 
it a state-law offense to “knowingly” or “intentionally” employ “an unau-
thorized alien,” defined so as to incorporate the federal-law definition of 
illegal status.44 The law also mandates that employers verify the employ-
ment eligibility of new hires using the E-Verify system,45 though under 
federal law, E-Verify is only a voluntary-use pilot program, in part 
because of concerns about the risk of error and resultant discrimina-
tion. The mandates are backed by penalties centered on licensing revo-
cation, relying on a savings clause for “licensing and similar laws” in the 
Figure 8.1. Arizona vrs. national violent crime rate per 100,000 of the poplulation.
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express preemption provision of the federal Immigration Reform and 
Control Act (IRCA). The Supreme Court ruled that the law was valid 
under the licensing savings clause, noting that the law was confined 
to licensing of in-state businesses, not an area of traditional federal 
dominance.46 
 The distinguishing aspect of the new breed of laws, however, is the 
multifront attack with the aim of “attrition” —interfering in the admis-
sion and expulsion of suspected aliens—by rendering suspected for-
eigners into an untouchable caste.47 Because of the prevalence of race, 
language, and culture-based heuristics for outsider alienage—cognitive 
rules of thumb that may generate persistent biases—the laws sweep 
overbroadly to impact people perceived as foreign, even if lawfully 
present. Concern over the impact on people perceived as foreign has 
roused protest not only within the United States but also abroad, inter-
fering with diplomatic relations.48
 Decades ago, the Supreme Court explained that in enacting a uni-
form national immigration system, Congress manifested the purpose 
of leaving the law-abiding “free from the possibility of inquisitorial 
practices and police surveillance. . . .”49 The new breed of laws aggres-
sively transgresses this approach in aiming for an atmosphere of fear 
and hostility that impacts not only those who are unlawfully present 
but also those who are suspected to be so because of race, culture, and 
language.
Figure 8.2. Arizona vrs. national property crime rate per 100,000 of the poplulation.
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B. The Attack on U.S.-Born Children of Noncitizen Parents
Another movement afoot is the attack on U.S.-born children of alien 
parents. Proponents would overrule longstanding Supreme Court 
precedent and rewrite the Constitution to deny citizenship to native-
born people whose parents are noncitizens.50 The movement capital-
izes on anti–illegal alien hostility to claim a righteous struggle against 
the sinister, sneaking “anchor baby” and the alleged incentive to enter 
the United States illegally in order to gain birthright citizenship for the 
baby.51 But behind the anti–“illegal alien invasion” banner, the move-
ment has an even more aggressive aim. 
 Proponents argue that even native U.S.-born children of many law-
fully present noncitizens should not be birthright citizens.52 Legislative 
proposals aim to exclude children of parents lawfully present on tempo-
rary visas.53 Most broadly, theorists trying to justify the attack suggest 
that children of foreign nationals in general, lawfully present or not, are 
ineligible for birthright citizenship.54 Proponents would exclude from 
the purview of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause, for 
example, first-generation Americans, such as this writer, born of people 
who lawfully immigrated to America to attend school or lawfully reside 
in America on work visas. The scope of the attack shows the enduring 
wisdom behind Martin Niemöller’s poem that begins, “First they came 
for the [vilified group] and I did not speak out / Because I was not a 
[member of the vilified group].” The poem ends, “Then they came for 
me—and there was no one left to speak for me.”
 To achieve their aim, proponents strain constitutional text and seek 
to overrule Framer intent, longstanding precedent, and the progress of 
American history and antidiscrimination values. Forged in the post–
Civil War era of progress in humanity and equality values, Section 1 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment provides, “All persons born or naturalized 
in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens 
of the United States and of the state wherein they reside.”55 Automatic 
citizenship for U.S.-born people bound the nation to the mast against 
the demons of racial loathing and caste carving that resulted in deci-
sions such as Dred Scott v. Sandford, ruling that descendants of African 
slaves, even if emancipated, cannot be citizens.56 
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 The criterion that U.S.-born people must be “subject to the jurisdic-
tion” of the United States is a narrow exception to birthright citizenship 
for the children of foreign ambassadors, hostile enemies in occupation, 
and Native Americans of sovereign tribes not taxed. The scope of the 
restrictive clause was settled by the Supreme Court’s decision in United 
States v. Wong Kim Ark in 1868.57 The Court ruled that a Chinese Amer-
ican born in the United States to legal permanent resident parents was a 
U.S. citizen within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.58 
 Wong Kim Ark linked the interests of first-generation Chinese with 
those of first-generation Europeans in explaining its interpretation of 
the Citizenship Clause. The Court reasoned, “To hold that the four-
teenth amendment of the constitution excludes from citizenship the 
children born in the United States of citizens or subjects of other coun-
tries, would be to deny citizenship to thousands of persons of English, 
Scotch, Irish, German, or other European parentage, who have always 
been considered and treated as citizens of the United States.”59 The Court 
concluded that whatever the animosities that led the political branches 
to exclude Chinese, the judiciary branch must “give full effect to the 
peremptory and explicit language” of the Fourteenth Amendment.60
 Latter-day revisionists argue that the notion of citizenship flowing 
from birth within the dominion (jus soli) is a feudal notion that clashes 
with American values. They argue for citizenship based on consent of 
the subject and of the nation. While they claim that this is a progressive 
vision, it is in actuality a cruelly regressive attempt to unbind ourselves 
from the mast of interests joined across racial lines that has weath-
ered the shifting racial animosities of the day. Community consent to 
belonging is influenced strongly by race. Without the automaticity of 
place of birth as a unifying force of belonging, there is a danger that 
racial fear and loathing would split the nation.
 Campaigners against U.S.-born children of noncitizens are also 
wrong in oversimplifying the choice as between a supposed outmoded 
feudal concept and the purported progressive notion of consent. The 
heritage and purpose of American birthright citizenship is not the feu-
dal tradition of the past but rather the realization that leaving citizen-
ship to the vagaries of racial animosities would lose the progress hard 
won in the Civil War that ravaged the nation. 
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II. Friend-Enemy Politics
In another society under strain, riven by economic woes and fierce 
doubt, Carl Schmitt argued that the fundamental distinction on which 
political life rests is that of friend and enemy.61 The enemy is “the other, 
the stranger; and it is sufficient for his nature that he is, in a specially 
intense way, existentially something different and alien, so that in the 
extreme case, conflicts with him are possible.”62 As for the friend side of 
the equation, the “us” in a democratic polity, Schmitt argued that homo-
geneity was crucial and necessitated—“if the need arises—elimination 
or eradication of heterogeneity.”63 He cited as examples the expulsion 
of the Greeks from Turkey and the prevalence of national laws, such as 
those of Australia at the time, restricting immigrants to the “right type 
of settler.”64 
 Schmitt wrote during the economic travails of the Weimar Repub-
lic preceding the Third Reich, for which he would be later the “crown 
jurist.”65 He openly voiced a logic that flares with particular ferocity 
when nations struggle with economic travails and doubts. In the past 
and our present, the political66 and the polity reinvigorate in times 
of doubt and turmoil through conflict with the “Other” and attempts 
to purge this foreign enemy within. Dissident political groups try to 
rouse support against current power holders using a rallying cry of 
threat with an explicitly or implicitly racialized face. This process of 
pronounced differentiation is a means through which faith and fer-
vor in an “us” as an identity is regenerated despite the travails of the 
times.
 Those vilified and used to define the boundary between our national 
“us” and the threatening “Other” have historically taken different—gen-
erally raced—forms. Nativists of the past have vilified the Italians, Jews, 
Eastern Europeans, Irish, Blacks, Japanese, and Chinese, among others.67 
Demonstrating the acutely racialized nature of animosity, out-group 
Caucasians were often not perceived as white but instead as degraded 
“swarthy types” in the Social Darwinian scale.68 In this multitextured 
history of animosity, the story of the intensification of hostility and 
state and local laws against the Chinese in California around the time of 
the severe recession of the 1870s has resonances with, and insights for, 
our contemporary political and legal scene.
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A. Déjà Vu Politics
In 1878, Representative Horace Davis of California said of the 
“Chinaman,”
Twenty-eight years ago the pioneer Chinaman was welcomed with an 
eager curiosity, but with no foresight of the eventful consequences of 
his coming. To-day, he is found in every village, in every mining camp, 
utterly an alien in the body-politic, and like some foreign substance in 
the human body, breeding fever and unrest till that system is relieved of 
its unwelcome presence.69
Times were getting tougher after the boom years of the 1850s drew the 
Chinese to the gold fields, swamps, and mountains of California to clear 
the land and lay the tracks for the then-expanding economy. By the time 
of the severe recession that seized the United States in the 1870s, “many 
thousands of unemployed men” were saying “with great bitterness that 
but for [the Chinese] presence work and bread would be plenty.”70 The 
Chinese were accused of degrading labor and displacing white workers, 
of being by nature “voluntary slaves,” capable of subsisting and living 
cheaply like vermin.71 Opponents warned that masses of Chinese would 
render America an “Asiatic state.”72 The fear over the racial transfor-
mation of the nation and states presents a parallel with contemporary 
fears, voiced, for example, by Senator Russell Pearce, sponsor of Ari-
zona Senate Bill 1070, of America being “overrun” by “illegal aliens” and 
transformed into Mexico.73
 In another tactic with parallels to our present, the vilified alien 
“Chinaman” was associated with crime; advocates of anti-Chinese leg-
islation warned that China was sending masses of its unwanted crimi-
nals.74 The Chinese were accused of, among other things, selling and 
buying their women, gambling, prostitution, thievery, and violence 
against whites.75 
 In a third striking parallel with our present, fractious political groups 
campaigned against the presidential administration tenuously in power 
by whipping up anti-immigrant sentiment. In the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century, national politics were closely divided, with control 
of Congress and the presidency frequently shifting between the two 
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parties.76 Two “minority presidents” failed to win a majority of the vote 
and two presidents were elected on close splits, with a bare majority of 
less than twenty-five thousand votes.77 In an example of the tactics of the 
anti-administration reform politics of the era, a “Committee of Fifty” 
assembled in San Francisco decried the president and national gov-
ernment for “wantonly den[ying] to the people of the Pacific . . . relief 
from a scourge that menaces their very existence”—the “invasion of the 
subjects of the Mongolian empire.”78 They castigated the Republican 
presidents for opposing their calls to purge the Chinese, ignoring their 
“pleading for deliverance.”79 
B. Déjà Vu Laws
In this foment of overtly racialized hostility, state and local laws were 
deployed in an attempt to expel the Chinese through direct and indi-
rect methods. These state immigration interventions sometimes tried 
to skirt and sometimes unabashedly usurped the federal power over 
foreign commerce and admission of aliens. 
 In 1849, the Supreme Court held in The Passenger Cases that states 
may not interfere with the federal power to regulate foreign commerce 
by imposing passenger head taxes on ships entering a port.80 In one of 
eight opinions in the case, Justice McLean suggested that while “the 
municipal power of a State cannot prohibit the introduction of foreign-
ers brought to this country under the authority of Congress,” the state 
could “guard its citizens against diseases and paupers” by denying for-
eigners residence unless “security” was posted “to indemnify the public 
should they become paupers.”81 Apparently acting on this suggestion, 
in 1852 the California legislature enacted a law requiring a bond of five 
hundred dollars per noncitizen passenger.82 
 By 1855, the legislature had gotten bolder and enacted a direct tax 
titled “An Act to Discourage the Immigration to This State of Persons 
Who Cannot Become Citizens Thereof ”83—in other words, to discour-
age the immigration of nonwhites because, since 1790, Congress had 
limited naturalization to “a free white person.”84 The 1855 California 
law required ship masters or owners to pay a fifty-dollar head tax for 
any person “incompetent” to become a citizen.85 This unsubtle law was 
struck down two years later by the California Supreme Court in People 
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v. Downer, which arose from an action to exact $12,750 from a ship 
bearing Chinese passengers.86 
 Undaunted, the California legislature in 1858 enacted another unsub-
tle law in an attempt to steer immigration policy—“An Act to Prevent 
the Further Immigration of Chinese or Mongolians to This State”—
which forbade Chinese or Mongolians from entering the state or its 
ports.87 The act made it a misdemeanor, punishable by fine or imprison-
ment for three months to a year, for Chinese to land or to bring Chi-
nese in.88 When California attempted to enforce the law, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court declared it void and unconstitutional in an opinion 
never reported.89
 In 1876, the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated a modified version of 
the California statute requiring the posting of a $500 bond for every 
incoming passenger that a state-appointed “Commissioner of Immigra-
tion” deemed “lunatic, idiotic, deaf, dumb, blind, crippled, or infirm,” a 
convict or “lewd or debauched woman,” or otherwise “a public charge, 
or likely soon to become so.”90 Justice Field, riding circuit, had earlier 
ordered the release of Chinese women held under the statute as an 
impermissible state interference with the exclusive federal power over 
“the intercourse of foreigners with our people, their immigration to this 
country and residence therein.”91 
 Enfolded in Justice Field’s analysis were burgeoning equality con-
cerns. He stated that anti-Chinese feelings could not “justify any leg-
islation for their exclusion, which might not be adopted against the 
inhabitants of the most favored nations of the Caucasian race, and of 
Christian faith.”92 He deplored the discriminatory application of laws by 
state officials who were “shocked when a frail child of China is landed 
on our shores, and yet allow[] the bedizened and painted harlot of other 
countries to parade our streets and open her hells in broad day, with-
out molestation and without censure.”93 He suggested that an alternative 
basis for invalidating the legislation was the newly enacted legislation 
of 1870, implementing the equal protection guarantee of the recently 
adopted Fourteenth Amendment.94 In Chy Lung v. Freeman, a unani-
mous Supreme Court ruled that the law impermissibly interfered with 
the power of Congress to regulate commerce with foreign nations, rea-
soning in essence that one state could not inflict nationwide externali-
ties marring foreign relations and trade.95
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 While the Court did not address the discrimination argument Jus-
tice Field had made, it obliquely deplored the “extraordinary statute” 
that gave the commissioner arbitrary discretion to require bonds for 
any passenger who appeared to him to be an “idiot” or a potential “pau-
per” or “lewd woman.”96 Such unbounded discretion opened the door 
to “systematic extortion of the grossest kind,” the Court wrote.97 The 
specter of discrimination was thus obliquely acknowledged in the guise 
of concern over the law’s conferral of open-ended discretion through 
the use of vague terms. Chy Lung’s arbitrariness analysis was thus an 
intriguing precursor to vagueness doctrine cases a century later, such as 
Papachristou v. Jacksonville, which addressed antidiscrimination con-
cerns in the guise of arbitrariness and vagueness analysis.98
 The legislature and localities also tried alternative ways to drive out 
the Chinese, such as through licensing, taxes, and employment and 
housing laws. 
 California was particularly hard hit by the 1870s recession, the worst 
the fledgling nation had experienced, and widespread unemployment, 
mortgage foreclosures, and homelessness stirred radical reactions and 
calls for state constitutional reform.99 The anti-Chinese campaign was 
intensifying, stirred by rabble rousers such as Dennis Kearney of the 
self-styled “Workingmen’s Party.”100 The resulting revised California 
Constitution of 1879 included an article, simply titled “Chinese,” that 
forbade corporations from employing any Chinese or Mongolian and 
forbade the employment of Chinese in any state, county, municipal, or 
other public work “except in punishment for crime.”101 Lest there be any 
doubt about the intent behind the legislation, the final section declared, 
“The presence of foreigners ineligible to become citizens of the United 
States is declared to be dangerous to the well-being of the State, and the 
Legislature shall discourage their immigration by all the means within 
its power.”102
 In response, the legislature enacted laws criminalizing the employ-
ment of Chinese on pain of fines, imprisonment of at least two hun-
dred days and up to two years, and, upon a second conviction, forfei-
ture of the corporate charter, franchise, and privileges.103 Businessman 
Tiburcio Parrott was imprisoned for an alleged violation of the law.104 
He appealed his conviction, arguing first that the anti-Chinese law was 
void because it violated the Fourteenth Amendment and legislation 
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implementing the equal protection guarantee.105 Two judges wrote for 
the federal Circuit Court for the District of California, which invali-
dated the conviction and voided the anti-Chinese employment laws. 
Judge Hoffman noted, in an early interest-tying type of argument, that 
the law “might equally well have forbidden the employment of Irish, or 
Germans, or Americans, or persons of color, or it might have required 
the employment of any of these classes of persons to the exclusion of 
the rest.”106 
 Judge Hoffman ultimately framed his decision, however, not in the 
violation of the rights of the Chinese but in the violation of the rights of 
corporations, many of which, he noted, had ceased operations or faced 
closure if the anti-Chinese laws were enforced.107 He held that the right 
of corporations “to utilize their property, by employing such laborers 
as they choose” could not be overridden by the prohibited purpose of 
driving the Chinese out.108 Judge Sawyer, in contrast, was less shy about 
directly ruling that the California law was in violation of treaty pro-
tections, as well as the Fourteenth Amendment and laws implement-
ing the Fourteenth Amendment that gave “all persons” the “same right” 
to make and enforce contracts and enjoy “full and equal benefit of all 
laws.”109
 These skirmishes with aggressive state anti-immigrant legislation 
thus enfolded antidiscrimination concerns within alternate frames 
of invalidation that made shared interests in foreign commerce and 
vibrant business salient. The deployment of alternate frames for vin-
dicating antidiscrimination values helped transition a fractured and 
polarized polity in a time of social strain. These alternate modes of 
analysis underscored the shared interests at stake in ameliorating the 
harsh state legislation. Ultimately, these transitional frames paved the 
way for the development of antidiscrimination doctrine—including 
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, which invalidated the selective prosecution of Chi-
nese laundry operators on equal protection grounds.110 The Supreme 
Court famously held, 
Though the law itself be fair on its face, and impartial in appearance, 
yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil 
eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal 
discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to 
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their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of 
the constitution.111 
The many skirmishes with aggressive state legislation directly or indi-
rectly interfering with the admission and expulsion of the Chinese had 
sensitized the judicial eye to the underlying impact and intent behind 
formal legal guises.
 Part of the point of examining the history of unruly state and local 
passions is to show how even as law evolves, new forms can be vehicles 
for old impulses to drive out racially distinctive others. The lesson is 
important for our avowedly “postracial” times when racialized anxiet-
ies cannot be voiced openly aloud and must be dressed in legitimizing 
constructs that still pursue old goals.
III. Alternate Frames for Antidiscrimination Values
While the legislation creating proxy vehicles for venting racialized ani-
mosities rightly rouse fears of racialized harms, antidiscrimination law 
supplies scant succor. The Equal Protection Clause has a very high hur-
dle for plaintiffs to surmount, requiring proof of discriminatory intent 
behind the law112 or discrimination in the claimant’s case, if discrimina-
tory application is alleged.113 Savvy officials socialized in contemporary 
forms and conventions of behavior generally no longer provide such 
blatant evidence.
 Moreover, the Equal Protection Clause’s conscious-purpose standard 
altogether neglects the problems of implicit bias or racialized anxieties 
and angers that are unconscious or not fully acknowledged to ourselves 
but that nonetheless generate racialized harm.114 Constitutional crimi-
nal-procedure protections also offer no succor for racial harms because 
criminal-procedure doctrine simply directs claimants to the strictures 
and blind spots of equal protection doctrine.115 Antidiscrimination con-
cerns can, however, inform alternate frames for assessing the validity 
of the laws. The dangers of discrimination posed by the most aggres-
sive forms of new state laws can conflict with the balance struck by fed-
eral law between enforcement and antidiscrimination and be impliedly 
preempted. The risk of harm against suspected foreign nationals poses 
foreign policy complications that impermissibly intrude on the federal 
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power over foreign affairs. And the unleashing of discriminatory exclu-
sion posed by the campaign against native-born children of noncitizens 
should inform interpretation of constitutional text framed to protect 
against the dangers of carving out a lower caste. 
A. Informing Conflict Analyses
The recent opinion in Arizona v. United States offers excellent examples of 
how preemption analysis can reframe—and be enriched by—the shared 
interest in antidiscrimination values. Writing for the Court in affirming 
the invalidation of three controversial provisions of Arizona Senate Bill 
1070, Justice Kennedy captured the harms to the national interest posed 
by the new state immigration laws. In crafting the opinion, Justice Ken-
nedy took care to explain how federal coordination and control in setting 
immigration policy serve shared national interests. He explained that the 
“broad, undoubted power” of the national government over immigration 
policy benefits “trade, investment, tourism and diplomatic relations for 
the entire Nation, as well as the perceptions and expectations of aliens in 
this country who seek the full protection of its laws.”116 National enforce-
ment discretion served shared interests in “this Nation’s international 
relations” and “immediate human concerns.”117 This approach deftly 
linked individual and collective interests and harms.
 Portions of Justice Kennedy’s preemption analysis explained how the 
risk of harassment of disfavored groups also impaired national inter-
ests. He began the opinion by explaining the longstanding wisdom that 
“[o]ne of the most important and delicate of all international relation-
ships . . . has to do with protection of the just rights of a country’s own 
nationals when those nationals are in another country.”118 Invalidating 
§ 6 of the Arizona law, he noted that allowing state officers the power 
to arrest aliens on the basis of their assessment of removability—in 
disregard of federal procedures and safeguards—risked “unnecessary 
harassment of some aliens (for instance, a veteran, college student, or 
someone assisting with a criminal investigation) whom federal officials 
determine should not be removed.”119 The conflicting state provision 
presented an obstacle to the full design and purposes of federal law and 
the important national interests served by entrusting removal to the 
procedures and discretion of national enforcers.
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 At this early juncture, Justice Kennedy did not invalidate § 2(B) 
of the Arizona law, which requires state officials to make reasonable 
attempts to check the immigration status of any person stopped and 
detained or arrested on reasonable suspicion of unlawful alien status.120 
Noting the “basic uncertainty about what the law means and how it 
will be enforced” at this early stage, he stated that the opinion did not 
“foreclose other preemption and constitutional challenges to the law as 
interpreted and applied after it goes into effect.”121 Nevertheless, he gave 
Arizona incentive to construe the law in a manner that mitigates the 
risk of harassment and prolonged detention. 
 He warned that “[d]etaining individuals solely to verify their immi-
gration status would raise constitutional concerns” and referred to the 
line of cases invalidating prolonged detention after formally valid (and 
potentially pretextual) stops.122 He also noted that the opinion did not 
address “whether reasonable suspicion of illegal entry or another immi-
gration crime would be a legitimate basis for prolonging a detention, or 
whether this too would be preempted by federal law.”123 Thus, though 
the opinion did not directly address the great fear sparking waves of 
protests across the nation that people would be harassed on the basis 
of racial, linguistic, and cultural heuristics for “looking illegal,” it gave 
Arizona incentive to mitigate this concern. This warning was a judi-
cial nudge rather than a dictate, leaving states space to develop policies 
while relying on the utility of uncertainty to provide incentive not to 
transgress constitutional values.124 
B. The Virtues of Alternate Frames for Equality Values
Alternate frames can make shared interests rather than racial difference 
and divergence of interests salient, helping ameliorate inflamed percep-
tions. We become particularly parochial and polarized during times 
of economic and political turmoil, and resort to the politics of ferocity 
toward the threatening Other to rally a fearful, fractured, and doubting 
polity. Racial differentiation and divergence of interests become partic-
ularly salient and can operate as blinders. Negative stereotypes can be 
particularly pronounced. 
 Studies have found that an “ego threat” to self-regard activates nega-
tive ethnic stereotypes and heightens prejudice against out-groups.125 
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Social psychologists have theorized that part of the function of nega-
tive stereotypes is to help bolster self-regard.126 It is particularly impor-
tant in such times for law to help deactivate the tendency to resort to 
heightened out-group vilification and remind us of common ground 
and interest convergence.
 Invalidating the Arizona-style attrition-through-fear laws based on 
foreign affairs conflict, as proposed by concurring Judge Noonan in 
United States v. Arizona,127 makes shared interests salient. Legislation 
is invalidated not to “accommodate” the minorities against the major-
ity will, but to preserve shared interests in unimpaired commerce and 
international cooperation on important issues such as counternarcot-
ics and counterterrorism. Ultimately, Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the 
Court in Arizona v. United States eloquently rendered antidiscrimina-
tion norms majoritarian. Vindicating antidiscrimination norms did not 
entail a countermajoritarian pitting of an out-group’s interests against 
the desires of an already-riled polity. Rather, vindicating antidiscrimi-
nation interests was about vindicating the shared interest in federal 
structure and not allowing a patchwork of rogue jurisdictions to under-
mine a carefully crafted national balance.
 Another virtue of alternate frames is the ability to bridge across dis-
parate worldviews.128 Someone with a hierarchical worldview, for exam-
ple, might value federalism structure and foreign affairs power even 
if the protection of underprivileged minorities does not have strong 
appeal. Someone with an individualistic orientation may find resonant 
due process concerns against arbitrary and unchecked government 
power, whereas the notion that individual interests should give way 
to antidiscrimination and equality interests could be riling. Alternate 
frames for antidiscrimination norms can thus help communicate the 
import of these interests to the fractious skeptical whose support is 
most needed. 
 Why should the palatability of bases for decisions matter to courts, 
which, after all, are customarily conceived as set above the politi-
cal fray?129 To be effective and realized in reality, decisions need to be 
socially contextualized. For the values implanted by courts to be real-
ized in practice, they must take root and be accepted by the polity. Part 
of the art of crafting a judgment is to implant ideas that cultivate affin-
ity among those who disagree.130 Judges adjudicating some of the most 
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heated questions in our society must craft their standards carefully, cog-
nizant of the risk of backlash and resistance that entrench the very atti-
tudes and legislation that their decisions are trying to ameliorate.131 The 
risk of resistance and divergence between pronouncement and practice 
is particularly acute on polarizing issues in polarized times.
 Commentators have argued in different registers about the value of 
grounding equality interventions in shared interests.132 In the context 
of the African American struggle for equality, Derrick Bell argued that 
progress toward racial equality “will be accommodated only when it 
converges with the interests of whites.”133 He recalled how couching the 
import of enforcing school desegregation orders in terms of federal-
ism principles and respect for the courts’ role of interpreting law had 
more widespread appeal.134 In contrast, racial divergence in interests 
would undermine realization of equality protections, despite norma-
tive commitments and claims.135 Early campaigners for civil rights also 
apparently recognized the import of making interest-convergence argu-
ments. For example, countering the spate of anti-Chinese laws, Dr. J. G. 
Kerr wrote, “In this warfare against the Chinese, the rights and liberty 
of the white man are just as much at stake as those of the Chinaman. 
Both must stand or fall together.”136 While Bell’s theory was positivis-
tic, describing the world as it is rather than as it ought to be, there are 
prescriptive ramifications to the insight about behavior. As a pragmatic 
matter, choosing frames that make interest convergence salient is a way 
to better secure necessary majoritarian support for decisions vindicat-
ing equality values.
 Besides appealing externally to the polity, alternate frames that make 
social cohesion and interest convergence salient may also appeal inter-
nally to judicial centrists. Reva Siegel recently has illuminated how 
“racial moderates” on the Supreme Court adhere to an “antibalkiniza-
tion perspective” that “privileges laws that expressively affirm univer-
salism and commonality rather than difference and division.”137 This 
preference for approaches that ameliorate estrangement and division 
may also influence the approach taken to claims of harm posed by laws 
facially framed in terms of immigration status, but that have a tense 
relationship with race. Judicial decision making is often a group project 
wherein internal consensus as well as external consensus must be culti-
vated. A more palatable pathway that underscores interest convergence 
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rather than difference may thus have the double benefit of securing 
broader judicial as well as popular support. 
 The danger of alternate frames is that they may be used to avoid 
addressing altogether what is often the biggest concern regarding anti-
immigrant laws—the risk of racialized harms. Indeed, particularly in 
polarized and fierce times and contexts, there may be a desire to eschew 
or elide the vexing and ire-rousing concerns. Who wants to open Pan-
dora’s Box, or even slightly raise the lid, when times are tough enough? 
This approach, however, allows wounds to fester wholly unaired and 
emboldens the angry and anxious to enact intensifying and multi-
farious vehicles for venting ire at the expense of out-groups. Alternate 
frames are constructive rather than destructive when they take into 
account antidiscrimination concerns and address them in ways that are 
more palatable across worldviews and less polarizing—not when they 
ignore some of the biggest concerns altogether.
Conclusion
History’s repetitions, in different registers and legal forms, teach us the 
dangers of overreaching state and local laws used to vent frustrations 
on out-groups whose members are either overtly or implicitly racial-
ized. In times of fierce politics, the form and mode of judicial inter-
vention to curb divisive and destructive excesses matters. We must be 
attentive to how to manage the inflammation of feeling that gives rise 
to the surge of problematic laws. Unity-reinforcing frames of analysis 
such as preemption doctrine can be deployed in a manner that renders 
salient in more palatable fashion previous national commitments to 
antidiscrimination values and help foster the polarization-amelioration 
and cooperation necessary to curb the excesses and inflamed percep-
tions of the times.
 Closing his opinion for the Court, Justice Kennedy eloquently coun-
seled the wisdom of temperance and deliberation in the fierce and frac-
tious domain:
With power comes responsibility, and the sound exercise of national 
power over immigration depends on the Nation’s meeting its responsibil-
ity to base its laws on a political will informed by searching, thoughtful, 
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rational civic discourse. Arizona may have understandable frustrations 
with the problems caused by illegal immigration while that process con-
tinues, but the State may not pursue policies that undermine federal 
law.138
As the nation continues to fiercely debate immigration policies, this 
wisdom provides an important guide for the future in this fractious 
domain.
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